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study	 of	 smaller,	 unsuccessful	 treaty	 ports	 changes	 our	 understanding	 of	 colonial	





could	 frustrate	 potentially	 profitable	 endeavour;	 that	 treaty-port	 status	 benefited	




































already	achieved	by	undertaking	a	programme	of	 supervised	study.	 I	 suggested	that	 I	
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hulk:	 	 the	 hull	 of	 a	 decommissioned	 vessel	 used	 by	 foreign	 trading	
companies	as	a	floating	warehouse	
lijin:	 	 inland	transit	tax	on	the	carriage	of	goods	
Maritime	Customs:	 the	 foreign-managed	 customs	 service	 established	 in	 1854	 in	
Shanghai,	later	expanded	to	all	treaty	ports	






settlement:	 	 a	 tract	of	 land	at	a	 treaty	port	designated	 for	 foreign	occupation	





transit-pass:	 introduced	 in	1858	as	a	means	of	 shielding	 foreign	 imports	and	
exports	from	lijin	in	return	for	the	payment	of	an	additional	2½%	
duty	
treaty	port:	 	 a	 town,	 city	 or	 port	 opened	 by	 foreign	 treaty	 in	 which	 treaty	
powers	 could	 establish	 consulates	 and	 their	 merchants	 could	



























        At 10 o’clock this morning the Acting Commissioner of Customs personally 
hoisted the Chinese ensign on the Customs flagstaff, a guard of honour from the 
revenue steamer Fei-hoo presenting arms; the red ensign and the Chinese dragon 
flag fluttered from two houseboats, the temporary head-quarters of H.B.M. Consul 
and the Commissioner of Customs respectively, while three guns boomed forth 
from the revenue steamer. The ceremony over, the genial Commissioner of 
Customs invited all the foreigners present to his houseboat, where a bumper was 
drunk to the health of the new treaty port. 















experience	 in	 the	 country.	 Had	 all	 the	 others	 been	 successful	 commercial	 ventures,	
leaving	Jiangmen	an	exception?	Far	from	it.	Many	of	them	had	already	been	abject	failures	
























review	of	 the	 literature	 reveals	 that	 insufficient	 attention	 has	 been	 paid	 so	 far	 to	 the	
smaller	 treaty	 ports:	 the	 ones	 with	 no	 bright	 lights	 to	 attract	 historians	 and	 other	
commentators,	 the	 ones	 that	 failed	 to	 achieve	 their	 intended	 objectives.	 It	 is	
understandable	that	scholarly	studies	of	the	treaty-port	era,	how	it	came	about,	and	what	
we	can	learn	from	it,	dwell	on	the	success	stories,	particularly	Shanghai.	Yet	excluding	the	
smaller	 ports	 ignores	 three-quarters	 of	 the	 total	 number.	 In	 1904,	 twenty-six	 of	 the	
thirty-seven	ports	under	Maritime	Customs’	supervision	each	contributed	less	than	2%	
of	 the	 total	 value	 of	 trade;	 in	 1914,	 the	 figures	were	 38	 and	 47	 respectively.7	 In	 this	
dissertation	 I	 demonstrate	 that	 studying	 the	 unsuccessful	 members	 of	 the	 network	
changes	our	understanding	of	the	creation	of	treaty	ports,	and	shows	that	they	resulted	







land	and	sub-let	 it	to	foreign	lessees.	Others	had	a	 ‘settlement’,	where	individual	foreign	tenants	 leased	









Those	that	underperformed	I	refer	 to	as	 ‘failures’,	notwithstanding	that	many	of	 them	
succeeded	as	places	of	 indigenous	business.	Bickers	and	 Jackson	observed	 that	 in	 the	
treaty	ports	there	was	more	failure	than	success,	and	that	the	China	coast	was	‘a	shore	of	
disappointment’;	 but	 for	 illustration	 they	 used	 examples	 of	 personal	 failure	 and	
disappointment	among	foreign	treaty-port	residents,	rather	than	ports	themselves.8	My	
study	of	structural	failure	changes	our	understanding	of	this	disappointment.	To	do	this,	
I	 analyse	 the	 commercial	 failure	 of	 British	 efforts	 in	 two	 case-study	 ports:	Wenzhou	
(Wenchow)	and	Jiangmen.	In	terms	of	China’s	foreign	trade	for	1904	and	1914,	these	two	
combined	 contributed	 0.6%	 and	 0.9%	 respectively.9	 In	 my	 Conclusion,	 I	 address	 the	
extent	to	which	two	examples	are	representative	of	all	smaller	and	unsuccessful	treaty	
ports.	Nevertheless,	my	objective	in	examining	Wenzhou	and	Jiangmen	is	to	develop	four	
arguments	 relating	 to	 the	 British	 treaty-port	 experience	 that	 have	 hitherto	 not	 come	
together	in	treaty-port	scholarship:	
	
1. Although	 British	 policy	 was	 influenced	 heavily	 by	 mercantile	 interests,	 that	
influence	could	be	misplaced,	or	over-ridden	by	non-commercial	considerations.	
	






4. ‘The	 treaty	 ports’	 were	 not	 a	 homogeneous	 collection	 of	 spaces	 of	 thriving	
Western	commercial	enterprise.	
	
















that	 served	 their	 needs;	 they	 simply	 adapted	 existing	 commercial	 systems.10	 The	
consequent	onset	of	global	 trade	engendered	a	new	form	of	 imperialism,	one	that	had	
commerce	 as	 its	 aim	 rather	 than	 military	 conquest.	 It	 is	 in	 this	 context	 that	 British	
interests	sought	to	include	in	their	global	network	places	such	as	Wenzhou	and	Jiangmen.	






of	 contact.	 For	 300	 years,	 the	 Western	 presence	 in	 Asia	 comprised	 such	 marginal	
footholds.	 Larger	 ships	 and	 greater	 trade	 volumes	 demanded	 physically	 more	
convenient,	 sheltered	 locations:	 ports.	 Murphey	 defined	 a	 harbour	 as	 simply	 a	 place	
where	a	ship	can	shelter,	whereas	a	port	is	 ‘an	economic	concept,	a	centre	of	land-sea	
exchange’.11	 A	 port	 city	 is	 therefore	 ‘more	 than	 just	 a	 city	 that	 happens	 to	 be	 on	 a	

















Notwithstanding	 Darwin’s	 argument	 that	 imperialism	 has	 been	 the	 historic	 norm,	
Europeans	were	 largely	attracted	 to	Asia	by	 trade,	not	empire-building.14	By	 the	mid-




Karachi	 and	 Calcutta	 as	 nodes	 within	 Britain’s	 expression	 of	 empire.16	 Commercial	
opportunities,	 in	 the	 informal	 empire	 as	 in	 the	 formal,	 attracted	 businessmen	 and	
merchants,	creating	local	employment	through	the	development	of	ports	and	railways.17	
Foreign	 businesses	 wielded	 significant	 power	 and	 influence.	 The	 additional	 power	
implicit	in	the	presence	of	the	Royal	Navy	was	an	often-sought	comfort	in	the	port	cities	
of	 Britain’s	 informal	 empire,	 as	 it	 was	 in	 the	 formal,	 and	 suggested	 a	 security	 that	




Some	 British	 treaty	 ports	 in	 China	 had	 their	 genesis	 in	 hubris	 and	 a	 desire	 to	 block	






















context	without	 the	 first:	 trade.	Gallagher	and	Robinson	argued	that	Britain’s	 imperial	
policy	was	'trade	with	informal	control	if	possible;	trade	with	rule	when	necessary'.	The	






trade	 proponents,	 led	 to	Britain	 dominating	 China’s	 foreign	 trade.	 Subsequent	British	
government	policy	towards	China	was	influenced	heavily	by	commercial	priorities.	It	was	
only	when	its	dominance	was	challenged	by	other	powers,	with	different	agendas,	that	




to	open	China	 to	 foreign	 trade.	Despite	 complaints	about	 the	 restrictions	operating	 in	
Guangzhou,	 foreigners	were	making	money	 there.	More	 open	 ports,	 so	 they	 believed,	
would	mean	more	profits.20	Following	lobbying	by	the	China	traders	and	their	agents	in	
London,	 and	 canvassing	 in	 the	 Guangzhou	 English-language	 press,	 the	 1842	 Nanjing	
Treaty	 opened	 five	 coastal	 ports.21	Having	 secured	 a	 convincing	military	 victory	over	
































imports	 in	 the	 quantities	 British	 merchants	 anticipated.	 Besides,	 Chinese	 consumers	
were	unwilling	to	buy	foreign	items	that	were	dearer	and	less	suitable	than	indigenous	
equivalents.29	Moreover,	 by	 the	 1870s,	 foreign	 imports	were	 increasingly	 handled	 by	
Chinese	 merchants	 through	 their	 own,	 more	 efficient	 networks.	 Research	 by	 Wang	
indicated	that	 the	number	of	treaty	ports	had	no	bearing	on	the	 level	of	British	trade;	
























its	 related	 services,	 additions	 to	 the	 network	 would	 still	 benefit	 foreign	 interests	



















open	 trade,	 a	 principle	 that	 made	 Britain	 stand	 out	 among	 its	 rivals.35	 Chamberlain	
continued:	‘In	that	policy	we	stand	alone,	because	all	other	nations,	as	fast	as	they	acquire	







their	 remoteness	 from	the	principal	 fields	of	 foreign	commerce	 in	China,	 it	 is	moot	whether	or	not	 the	








March	 1898	 Germany	 leased	 Jiaozhou	 (Kiaochow).	 Initially	 a	 navy	 base,	 significant	
government	 expenditure	 was	 incurred	 to	 create	 a	 German	 showpiece	 to	 rival	 Hong	
Kong.37	 By	 1904	 there	was	 a	 large	military	 and	 naval	 population,	 a	 government	 that	
employed	hundreds	of	Germans,	and	about	50	businesses,	mostly	German.	Scores	more	
Germans	 were	 engaged	 in	 building	 the	 Shandong	 Railway.38	 Military	 and	 railway	
priorities	 also	 underlay	 Russia’s	 lease	 of	 Lüshun	 (Port	 Arthur)	 and	 Dalianwan	 on	 27	
March,	with	a	 similar	heavy	 investment	 in	 facilities	and	people,	 although	by	1904	the	
businesses	there	included	German,	Japanese,	American	and	Danish.39	In	the	south,	France	
leased	Zhanjiang	(Kwangchowwan)	on	22	April,	ostensibly	as	a	coaling	station.40	A	few	
years	 later	 French	 intentions	 became	 clear:	 there	 were	 eleven	 colonial	 government	


































other	 capital	 projects.	 The	 goal	was	 a	 ‘fiscal	 and	 administrative	 revolution’,	hopefully	
under	British	 tutelage.44	The	1902	Mackay	Treaty,	which	 inter	alia	 brought	about	 the	
opening	of	Jiangmen,	was	a	major	step	in	that	direction,	introducing	national	coinage	and	
laws	 relating	 to	 companies	 and	 trademarks.45	 It	 was	 the	 prospects	 of	 the	 business,	






this	 reflected	 in	Britain’s	dealings	with	China.	 I	have	also	examined	 the	 role	of	 treaty	
ports,	how	their	significance	altered	in	the	light	of	the	foreign	powers’	changing	priorities,	
and	 how	 these	 priorities	 were	 shaped	 by	 the	 opposing	 forces	 of	 competition	 and	
cooperation.	 In	 order	 to	 determine	 how	 my	 research	 changes	 conclusions	 drawn	 in	





























place	 in	 each	 Asian	 country,	 and	 that	 it	 was	 outsiders	 who	 initiated	 them.47	 I	 will	





trade.48	 Analysing	 that	 disappointment	 only	 at	 a	 macro-economic	 level,	 they	
contextualised	it	by	arguing	that	treaty	ports	were	intended	to	provide	a	cheap	and	self-

















Chinese	political	developments	 that	 took	place	 in	 the	 treaty	ports,	he	maintained	 that	
their	effect	was	largely	limited	to	the	ports	themselves.	Ignoring	successes	such	as	Dalian,	
Guangzhou,	Hankou	 (Hankow),	 Shanghai	 and	Tianjin	 (Tientsin),	Murphey	argued	 that	
treaty	ports	 remained	 isolated	enclaves	of	 foreign	activity,	with	minimal	effect	on	 the	
hinterland,	and	were	destined	ultimately	to	fail.49	Cohen	added	that,	given	the	internal	
unrest	that	demanded	the	Chinese	government’s	attention	in	the	late	nineteenth	century,	
the	 ‘nettling	behaviour	of	small	 enclaves	of	Westerners’	was	unlikely	 to	have	had	any	










port	 system	 a	 ‘means	 of	 imperialistic	 encroachment’,	 he	 recognised	 that	 the	 relative	
security	 of	 the	 ports	 enabled	 Chinese	 entrepreneurs	 to	 keep	 their	 wealth,	 thereby	
encouraging	indigenous	economic	activity.54	Osterhammel	added	to	the	argument	with	






52	 Thomas	G.	 Rawski,	 ‘Chinese	Dominance	 of	 Treaty	 Port	 Commerce	 and	 its	 Implications,	 1860–1875’,	
Explorations	in	Economic	History,	Vol.	7	(1970),	451–73.	
53	 Albert	 Feuerwerker,	 ‘Characteristics	 of	 the	 Chinese	 Economic	 Model	 Specific	 to	 the	 Chinese	







China	market.55	 Studying	 failed,	 smaller	 treaty	 ports	 such	 as	Wenzhou	 and	 Jiangmen	
enables	 us	 to	 reappraise	 these	 historians’	 various	 arguments	 and	 observations	 by	
demonstrating	that	 their	very	status	as	 treaty	ports	assisted	Chinese	entrepreneurs	 in	
developing	their	own	market.	
	
None	 of	 the	 studies	mentioned	makes	 particular	 reference	 to	 smaller	 ports.	 Brunero	
recently	 observed	 that	 despite	 the	 focus	 of	 treaty-port	 historians	 on	 Shanghai,	
scholarship	 is	 turning	 towards	 the	 smaller	 ports;	 but	 she	 then	 used	 Hankou	 as	 an	
illustration.	Hankou	was	not	small;	its	trade	was	third	and	fourth	largest	(out	of	37	and	




of	 specific	ports.	 Although	 one	was	 not	 in	 China,	 each	 shows	what	 can	 be	 learned	 by	
looking	 through	 general	 principles	 to	 specific	 scenarios.	 First,	 in	 his	 analysis	 of	 the	
Malaysian	port	of	Penang,	McPherson	observed	that	the	commercial	hopes	for	the	port	














and	 Stephanie	Villalta	 Puig	 (eds.),	Life	 in	 Treaty	 Port	 China	 and	 Japan	 (Singapore:	 Palgrave	Macmillan,	
2018),	24–5.	Data	taken	from	Customs	Decennial	1902–11,	328–30;	and	Customs	Decennial	1912–21,	424–
6.	
57	 Penang:	 Kenneth	 McPherson,	 ‘Penang	 1786–1832:	 A	 Promise	 Unfulfilled’,	 in	 Frank	 Broeze	 (ed.),	
Gateways	of	Asia	(London:	Kegan	Paul	International,	1997),	109–26.	Weihai:	T.G.	Otte,	The	China	Question:	



















London	 took	 notice	 of	 their	 empire,	 a	 question	 that	 is	 debated	 among	 historians.	
MacKenzie	 and	 Cannadine	 argued	 that	 the	 Victorian	 empire	 was	 a	 thread	 running	
through	the	 lives	of	every	Briton,	at	home	and	abroad.	Conversely,	Darwin	and	Porter	
argued	 that	 only	 the	upper	 and	middle	 classes	 identified	with	 the	process	 of	 empire-
building.60	I	suggest	that	the	existence	of	minor	and	distant	imperial	experiments	would	












60	 John	M.	MacKenzie,	Propaganda	 and	Empire:	 The	Manipulation	 of	 British	 Public	 Opinion,	 1880–1960	






empire’	has	been	contested	among	historians.	Darwin	argued	 that	 it	 is	 a	 term	 ‘whose	
utility	 has	 made	 it	 indispensable’,	 whereas	 Stoler	 dismissed	 it	 as	 an	 ‘unhelpful	
euphemism’.62	An	overly-scientific	attempt	was	made	by	Osterhammel;	he	defined	ten	
basic	features	of	informal	empire,	then	admitted	his	definition	was	‘fairly	restrictive’.63	







Potter	 analysed	 in	 detail	 Gallagher	 and	 Robinson’s	 contribution	 to	 the	 distinction	






diplomatic	 regime	 fashioned	 to	 the	 circumstances	 of	 a	 particular	 region.’67	 It	 is	 the	
manner	 in	which	 that	 regime	was	 fashioned	 in	 China	 that	 is	 important	 to	my	 study.	








































An	 understanding	 of	Britain’s	 policy	 gives	 insights	 as	 to	why	 some	 treaty	 ports	were	

















the	 Qing	 government.74	 Bickers	 even	 suggested	 that	 the	 Chinese	 Maritime	 Customs	
service	was	an	active	agent	 in	 the	treaty-port	process,	with	Robert	Hart,	as	 Inspector-
General,	striving	for	China	‘to	become	part	of	the	world’.75	Cassel	observed	that	in	1860,	




study,	 especially	 in	 light	 of	 the	 anticipated	 collapse	 of	 the	 Chinese	 Empire.77	 As	 the	
leading	foreign	presence	in	China	during	those	years,	Britain	was	open	to	challenge	from	






However,	 it	 also	 reveals	 a	 number	 of	 inadequacies.	 For	 example,	 when	 theories	
articulated	 for	 informal	 empire	 are	 applied	 to	 China	 they	 lose	 clarity;	 China	 also	
comprised	zones	of	formal	empire,	often	with	very	diffuse	practical	distinctions	between	






















clearly	 that	Wenzhou	and	 Jiangmen	did	not.	No	economic	 constraints	or	public	policy	














as	 centres	 of	 British	 commerce.	 I	 will	 do	 this	 by	 studying	 the	 performance	 of	 two	

























importance’.83	 My	 study	 addresses	 the	 apparent	 inconsistency	 between	 this	 and	 the	
continued	opening	of	more	treaty	ports.	Even	if	not	on	the	route	to	anywhere	important,	
itself	 a	 questionable	 view,	 China	 was	 a	 theatre	 of	 intense	 inter-power	 rivalry.	
Preoccupation	with	being	outdistanced	by	 rivals	 led	 to	rationality	being	overlooked.	 I	






























However,	 Wenzhou,	 Jiangmen	 and	 many	 others	 also	 served	 Chinese	 merchants	 by	
introducing	 foreign	methods	to	 indigenous	networks.	Since	the	Macartney	Embassy	of	
1792–4,	Qing	officials	had	been	concerned	that	foreign	incursions	would	divert	Chinese	
subjects’	 loyalty.87	 Their	 fears	were	 vindicated	when	 enterprising	 Chinese	merchants	
used	 the	 treaty-port	 system	 increasingly	 to	 their	 own	 advantage.	 Thus,	 the	 foreign	
presence	in	China	was	generally	a	collaborative	enterprise,	even	if,	as	Bickers	argued,	the	
collaborators	 were	 unequal	 partners.88	 Research	 by	 Hao	 developed	 aspects	 of	 this	
relationship,	 in	 particular	 the	 role	 of	 the	 comprador	 and	 the	 emergence	 of	 Chinese	





































ports’,	 but	 their	 book	 then	 focused	 on	 the	 larger	 ports.93	 Some	 treaty	 ports	 were	
extremely	 large	 centres	 of	 both	 foreign	 and	 Chinese	 business.	 The	 dominance	 of	 the	
larger	ports	can	be	seen	by	looking	again	at	the	value	of	treaty-port	trade	in	1904,	when	
Jiangmen	 achieved	 that	 status,	 and	 1914.	 The	 largest	 10%	 of	 the	 ports	 contributed	























study	 is	 not	 to	 refute	 this,	 but	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 there	 were	 also	 significant	
dissimilarities,	not	only	in	size	but	also	in	function.	The	assertions	by	Darwin,	Cain	and	















Yet	 its	 performance	 as	 a	 treaty	 port	 was	 dismal.	 My	 research	 shows	 that	 optimism	





I	 chose	 Jiangmen	 as	 an	 example	 of	 commercial	 considerations	 being	 overridden	 by	
geostrategic	priorities.	Similar	to	Wenzhou,	Jiangmen	illustrates	a	degree	of	unfounded	
optimism	 regarding	 its	 selection	 as	 a	 treaty	 port.	 However,	 whatever	 commercial	
arguments	 there	may	have	 been	were	given	 less	priority	 than	 fears	 regarding	French	
ambitions	in	south-west	China.	Nearby	Sanshui	had	been	a	treaty	port	since	1897,	but	




99	 28	 October	 1869,	 Alcock	 to	 Clarendon,	 in	 China	 No.	 1	 (1870):	 Despatch	 from	 Sir	 Rutherford	 Alcock	
respecting	a	Supplementary	Convention	to	the	Treaty	of	Tien-tsin	signed	by	him	on	October	23,	1869,	3.	
	23	
would	 succeed	 where	 Sanshui	 had	 failed.	 I	 demonstrate	 this	 hope	 not	 only	 to	 be	











from	1904	 to	 1905.	 The	 closure	 of	 both	 establishments	 reflected	 not	only	 the	 lack	of	
British	business	at	 the	 respective	ports,	but	also	a	 retrenchment	of	Britain’s	 consular	
presence	generally	in	China	during	the	early	twentieth	century.102	
	











questions	 about	 the	 intentions	 and	 perceptions	 of	 the	 actors	 concerned,	 and	 their	
reactions	 and	 frustrations	when	 their	plans	were	 not	 fulfilled.	 Quantitative	 data	 from	
																																																								
100	Two	more	treaty	ports	were	opened	in	Tibet	later	in	1904.	






Customs	 and	 other	 sources	 have	 helped	me	 to	 interpret	what	was	 recorded	 in	 their	
letters	and	reports.	Unfortunately,	I	was	only	able	to	use	the	records	of	one	side	of	the	





Chapter	One	 is	 devoted	 to	Wenzhou,	 the	 study	 of	which	 develops	 all	 four	 arguments	
detailed	above:	its	selection	was	based	on	misplaced	mercantile	influence;	local	taxation	
inhibited	 British	 merchants’	 efforts;	 certain	 of	 its	 privileges	 were	 appropriated	 by	
indigenous	interests;	and	it	demonstrates	treaty	ports	were	not	homogeneous.	Chapter	













Map	 showing	 Wenzhou	 (Wen-chow)	 in	 Zhejiang	 (Chekiang)	 province,	 mid-way	 between	














pressed	 for	 its	 opening	 for	 many	 years,	 British	 merchants	 took	 no	 serious	 steps	 to	





port	 cities,	 in	 the	 mid-nineteenth	 century.	 It	 was	 flourishing.	 Founded	 in	 the	 fourth	
century,	 by	 the	 thirteenth	 Wenzhou	 was	 the	 site	 of	 one	 of	 China’s	 seven	
Superintendencies	of	Merchant	Shipping.2	During	the	Ming	dynasty	the	city	was	the	main	





were	 diverted	 north	 to	 Ningbo	 and	 Shanghai,	 where	 the	 British	 presence	 ensured	 a	
degree	 of	 security,	 and	 south	 to	 Fuzhou	 (Foochow),	 which	 remained	 outside	 rebel	
control.	Buildings,	temples	and	ceremonial	archways	testified	to	its	former	wealth,	but	




time,	 treaty	 ports	 had	 evolved	 to	 become	 nodes	 in	 a	 coastal	 and	 riverine	 shipping	
network,	 and	here	was	one	being	opened	at	 the	behest	of	Britain,	 the	 leading	 foreign	
power	in	China.	Its	success	should	have	been	assured.		Yet,	despite	British	interest	having	
been	 expressed	 repeatedly	 over	 the	 previous	23	 years,	 as	 a	 site	 of	 foreign	 commerce	













(Chinkiang);	 my	 own	 study	 of	 Qiongzhou	 (Kiungchow);	 and	 Villalta	 Puig’s	 brief	
description	of	the	climate	and	health	issues	that	faced	Wenzhou,	Jiujiang	(Kiukiang)	and	
Wuhu.	 Shantou	 (Swatow)	 only	 featured	 as	 background	 to	 personal	 reminiscences.	
Yichang	(Ichang)	received	tangential	mention	in	the	context	of	early	steam	navigation	of	
the	 Yangzi,	 while	 Beihai	 (Pakhoi)	 has	 received	 no	 literary	 attention,	 scholarly	 or	
otherwise.6	 All	 of	 these	 smaller	 ports,	 falling	 outside	 any	 perceivable	British	 strategy	
regarding	 China,	 are	 exemplars	 of	 Goodman	 and	 Goodman’s	 concept	 of	 ‘piecemeal	
agglomeration’	of	‘peripheral	intrusions’.7	
	
Wenzhou	 does	 feature	 in	 consular	 and	 missionary	 accounts	 of	 China.	 Despite	 its	
disappointing	 commercial	 performance,	 a	 British	 consulate	 was	 retained	 there	 from	
1877	to	1907.8	The	consuls’	main	occupation	at	Wenzhou	was	handling	matters	relating	
to	occasional	riots	and	anti-foreign	demonstrations;	there	being	few	other	foreigners	to	

































produce	 the	 desired	 results	 challenges	Gallagher	 and	Robinson’s	 thesis	of	 'trade	with	
informal	control	if	possible;	trade	with	rule	when	necessary'.12	In	China,	British	interests	
were	faced	repeatedly	with	being	able	to	neither	control	informally	nor	rule	formally	in	
order	 to	 achieve	 their	 trading	 ambitions,	 resulting	 often	with	 the	 frustration	of	 those	
ambitions.	 Studying	 the	 failure	 of	 Wenzhou	 supports	 the	 arguments	 detailed	 in	 the	




that	would	 not	 be	 seen	 by	 examining	 only	 larger,	 successful	 ports.	 Second,	Wenzhou	






















but,	 as	 I	demonstrate,	 the	prospect	of	 that	 status	not	being	 regained	was	overlooked.	
Moreover,	 I	 reveal	 a	 number	 of	 contradictions	within	 official	 British	 correspondence	
regarding	 the	 claimed	attraction	of	Wenzhou.	Despite	 these,	 there	 is	no	evidence	of	 a	
reassessment	of	the	port’s	potential	by	any	of	its	promoters,	be	they	British	merchants	in	
Hong	Kong	or	Shanghai,	British	officials	 in	London	or	Beijing,	or	Hart	and	the	Chinese	





that	 arose,	 almost	 as	 soon	 as	 it	was	 opened,	 as	 none	 of	 the	British	 expectations	was	









the	 time	 it	 opened;	 British	 attempts	 to	 establish	 a	 presence;	 reactions	 by	 Chinese	
merchants	in	neighbouring	cities;	and	the	growth	of	Chinese	shipping	operations.	
	
The	 key	 to	 understanding	 why	 no	 British	merchants	 came	 to	 the	 port	 is	 the	 lack	 of	
adequate	 research	 beforehand,	 during	 the	 many	 years	 in	 which	 interest	 was	 being	












In	 1851	 Samuel	 Bonham,	 Superintendent	 of	 British	 Trade	 in	 China,	 made	 a	 formal	
application	 to	 the	 Chinese	 government	 to	 exchange	 them	 for	 Hangzhou	 (Hangchow),	
Suzhou	(Soochow)	and	Zhenjiang;	 the	request	was	refused.14	Fuzhou’s	prospects	soon	
























Hosea	Ballou	Morse	 has	 argued	 that	 they	must	 have	 been	Hangzhou	 and	Wenzhou	 (The	 International	
Relations	of	the	Chinese	Empire	[Shanghai:	Kelly	&	Walsh,	1910],	I	414).	
18	Customs	Decennial	1882–91,	387,	recorded	the	vessels’	presence;	Britten	Dean	identified	that	they	were	










Maozhuling	 by	 Fuzhou	Customs	staff	 for	 trading	 at	 an	 unopened	 port.20	 In	 a	 letter	 to	
Shanghai	 Consul	 Walter	 Medhurst,	 the	 influential	 Shanghai	 General	 Chamber	 of	
Commerce	deplored	 the	 taking	away	of	business	 from	 foreign	 shipowners,	 something	
they	wanted	reversed.	Being	a	British-dominated	body,	representing	all	foreign	traders	
in	Shanghai,	the	Chamber	naturally	failed	to	attach	any	significance	to	the	other	side	of	
the	activity:	 the	assumption,	or	 resumption,	of	 that	business	by	Chinese	merchants,	 a	
process	not	capable	of	reversal.	This	loss	of	British	business	in	the	vicinity	of	Wenzhou	
was	an	opportunity	 to	reassess	the	port’s	prospects,	yet	 the	Chamber	was	confident	a	
trade	 in	 foreign	 goods	 ‘would	 doubtless	 spring	 up’	 there	 if	 it	were	 opened	 to	 foreign	
vessels.21	
	





respondents	 proposed	 that	 Wenzhou	 be	 opened.	 For	 example,	 British	 merchants	 at	
Xiamen	reported	the	former	considerable	trade	with	Wenzhou	would	revive	‘and	vastly	
increase’	should	the	port	be	opened.	The	Shanghai	Chamber	added	that	 there	was	 ‘no	












by	 the	 Chinese	 government	 in	 1869,	 named	 Wenzhou	 as	 a	 treaty	 port.24	 In	 his	
memorandum	submitting	the	treaty	to	London	for	ratification,	Alcock	noted	 ‘an	entire	





















were	 menacing	 coastal	 shipping,	 damaging	 China’s	 economy.	 In	 a	 note	 to	 the	 Zongli	
Yamen,	China’s	de	 facto	 foreign	ministry,	Alcock	 stated	 that	 the	opening	of	new	ports	
‘would	 seem	 to	 be	 more	 in	 the	 interest	 of	 the	 Chinese	 revenue	 than	 of	 the	 foreign	
																																																								
23	 British	 Merchants	 at	 Amoy	 to	 Consul	 William	 Pedder,	 8	 February	 1869	 (China	 No.	 5	 [1871],	 300);	









merchant’.28	 He	 explained	 that	 the	 opening	 of	 Wenzhou	 would	 serve	 not	 only	 the	
extension	 of	 trade,	 but	 would	 also	 ‘tend	 materially	 to	 the	 suppression	 of	 piracy’.29	
Alcock’s	abortive	treaty,	in	addition	to	taking	the	bold	step	of	treating	the	Chinese	and	
British	states	as	equals,	was	the	first	to	have	been	drafted	as	a	result	of	patient	negotiation	
and	analysis,	 rather	 than	 force	majeure.	Nevertheless,	 it	 seems	unlikely	 that	he	would	
have	proposed	the	opening	of	a	port	simply	to	serve	Chinese	concerns.	Moreover,	as	no	
interest	 was	 shown	 in	Wenzhou	 by	 Britain’s	 imperial	 rivals,	 the	 opening	 of	 the	 port	
cannot	be	seen	as	contributing	to	any	geostrategic	or	imperial	purpose.	We	are	therefore	








line	of	 steamers	between	Foochow	and	Shanghai’.31	This	 comment	would	prove	 to	be	
unfortunate.	 Besides,	 with	 Wenzhou	 remaining	 unopened,	 such	 confidence	 became	
irrelevant.	 Moreover,	 the	 Alcock,	 and	 previous,	 correspondence	 contains	 certain	
contradictions	 regarding	 the	 attractiveness	 of	 Wenzhou	 as	 a	 treaty	 port.	 These	





















traders	 and	 likely	 to	 remain	 so,	 thereby	 bringing	 no	 obvious	 benefit	 to	 any	 British	
merchant	who	might	establish	himself	in	Wenzhou.33	Third,	the	reference	by	the	Xiamen	
merchants	in	1869	to	the	potential	for	‘vast’	trade	was	qualified	by	the	admission	that	












part	 of	 the	 country,	 even	 though	 the	 port	 was	 already	 in	 decline.36	 Alcock	 did	 not,	
however,	follow	Hart	regarding	the	number	of	ports	to	be	opened.	The	two	men	worked	
closely	 together	on	Alcock’s	proposed	treaty,	which	called	 for	 the	opening	of	only	two	
new	ports:	Wenzhou	and	Wuhu.	Hart	had	provided	a	list	of	ten.37	As	mentioned,	Hart	saw	
the	benefit	of	treaty	ports	as	points	of	contact,	although	from	about	this	time	the	primary	
function	 of	 a	 treaty	 port	 was	 becoming	 a	 link	 in	 a	 broadening	 transport	 network	
extending	beyond	servicing	foreign	trade.38	Despite	the	contradictions	I	have	identified,	







37	Hart	 to	Alcock,	6	December	1868	(Nish,	British	Documents,	303–4).	Of	 the	 ten	suggested	by	Hart,	 six	
would	in	time	be	opened	either	as	treaty	ports,	or	ports-of-call	on	the	Yangzi.	Hart	promoted	a	similar	list,	


































will	develop	 this	 argument	by	 considering	 four	aspects	of	Wenzhou’s	experience	as	a	
treaty	port.	 First,	 an	examination	of	 its	 commercial	 activity	at	 the	 time	 it	was	opened	
shows	that	it	was	a	market	difficult	for	foreigners	to	exploit.	Second,	analysis	of	foreign	
attempts	to	establish	business	at	Wenzhou	reveals	that	there	was	no	‘vacuum	waiting	to	
be	 filled’.41	 Third,	 actions	 taken	 by	 Chinese	 merchants	 in	 neighbouring	 cities	 and	









During	 negotiations	 for	 the	 Chefoo	 Convention,	 Hart	 described	Wenzhou	 as	 ‘the	 only	
coast	port	of	importance	not	yet	open’.42	The	city	was	a	distribution	centre	for	bamboo,	
oranges,	wooden	poles,	and	opium,	all	for	domestic	consumption.	Of	interest	to	foreign	


























A	 more	 comprehensive	 study	 was	 made	 two	 months	 later	 by	 Arthur	 Davenport.	
Instructed	by	Wade,	Davenport	arrived	on	7	February	1877	on	a	fact-finding	visit.	Aged	




















‘native	 dealers’	 for	 distribution	 in	 the	 interior,	 adding	 that	 the	 rates	 of	 lijin	 were	




This	 report,	 from	 a	 more	 experienced	 man,	 contains	 a	 number	 of	 incongruities	 and	














remain	 unanswerable,	 but	 there	 is	 enough	 in	 Davenport’s	 report	 to	 throw	 doubt	 on	





















Davenport,	 inspected	 Davenport’s	 site,	 accompanied	 by	 Jardine	 Matheson	 partner	
William	Paterson,	and	concluded	the	expense	of	draining	and	raising	it	was	prohibitive.54	
Instead,	Alabaster	chose	a	narrow	plot	between	the	city	wall	and	the	river,	and	signed	
another	agreement.	He,	 too,	was	 later	 criticised,	by	Foreign	Secretary	Lord	Derby,	 for	














iron	 ore,	 but	 his	 superiors	 found	 they	 could	 not	 exploit	 it	 profitably.	 Jardines	 also	
















An	 1877	map	 of	Wenzhou	 (rotated	 to	maximise	 size).	 The	 red	markers	 at	 the	 top	 show	






the	 published	 rates	 as	 ‘most	 exorbitant’.	 The	 treaty-port	 press	 decried	 the	 related	
regulations	as	‘ludicrous	in	the	extreme’;	for	example,	the	lijin	collector	gave	himself	the	
right	 to	 search	 foreign	 and	 Chinese	 merchants’	 premises	 and	 examine	 their	 books,	







Despite	 this	 unpromising	 start,	 Warren’s	 1877	 Commercial	 Report	 for	 Wenzhou	
remained	optimistic.63	Matching	Davenport’s	earlier	assessment,	Warren	concurred	that	
Wenzhou	was	‘the	natural	outlet’	for	the	tea	exported	through	Fuzhou,	and	that	it	was	‘on	
tea	 that	 the	 future	 prosperity	 of	 the	 Port	 depends’.	 He	 added	 that	 Wenzhou	 would	
supplant	 Fuzhou	 and	 Ningbo	 as	 the	 district’s	 supplier	 of	 foreign	 goods.	 However,	
concluding	that	‘as	soon	as	business	improves	somewhat’	Wenzhou	would	prosper	once	






echoing	 Davenport’s	 observation,	 he	 noted	 that	 the	 number	 of	 junks	 was	 ‘singularly	
small’.	The	reason	he	gave	was	the	failure	of	many	of	the	merchants	who	had	formerly	
traded	 with	 Xiamen,	 Shantou,	 Taiwan,	 and	 Singapore.	 There	 remained	 in	 Wenzhou,	











it	 to	 London	 Fraser,	 in	 Beijing,	 questioned	 Warren’s	 enthusiasm	 for	 Wenzhou’s	
advantages.64	
	
That	 such	 doubts	 were	 being	 expressed	 only	 a	 few	months	 after	 the	 port’s	 opening	
underlines	 the	 inadequate	 prior	 research.	Warren’s	 Commercial	 Report	 for	 1878,	 the	














Jardines’	 dual	 focus	 caused	 their	 efforts	 at	Wenzhou	 to	 be	 unsuccessful.68	 Reinhardt	
showed	 that	 increasing	 the	 number	 of	 treaty	 ports,	 such	 as	 happened	with	 the	 1858	
Tianjin	Treaty,	did	not	result	in	a	corresponding	increase	in	foreign	business.69	Rather,	
new	ports	 tended	to	enhance	opportunities	 for	Chinese	merchants	 to	sell,	and	 in	turn	






67	 Liu	 Kwang-ching,	 Anglo-American	 Steamship	 Rivalry	 in	 China:	 1862–1874	 (Cambridge:	 Harvard	
University	Press,	1962),	155.	
68	Rawski,	‘Chinese	Dominance’,	461.	






Into	this	evolving	scenario,	 two	other	 foreign	vessel	operators	 tried	to	establish	a	link	
between	Wenzhou	 and	 nearby	 ports.	 As	 I	 show	 below,	 neither	 was	 successful.	 They	
claimed	that	a	lack	of	foreign	merchants	at	the	port	made	their	efforts	unremunerative,	
whereas	foreign	merchants	who	may	have	been	interested	in	Wenzhou	complained	of	the	
lack	of	 a	 regular	shipping	service.	 It	was	a	 stalemate	 that	 showed	no	 sign	of	solution.	
Furthermore,	the	relatively	weak	standing	of	local	merchants,	evidenced	by	their	lack	of	
capital,	was	a	 factor	of	which	prospective	 foreign	 investors	 in	Wenzhou	soon	became	
aware.	Operating	necessarily	on	a	small	scale,	Wenzhou	merchants	required	only	lower-
grade	 imports,	yet	still	demanded	generous	credit	 terms.	As	 for	exports,	 the	 foreigner	











Between	the	 late	1870s	and	the	1910s,	 the	 foreign	population	of	Wenzhou	comprised	
only	consular	and	Customs	people,	and	missionaries.	A	picture	of	what	life	was	like	for	
them	is	given	by	the	North-China	Herald.	In	the	treaty	port’s	early	years,	the	newspaper	














delivery,	 and	 no	 Shanghai	 newspapers.76	 Moving	 forward	 twenty	 years	 the	
correspondent	had	changed,	the	frequency	had	become	monthly	or	less	but,	apart	from	




Jubilee	 in	 June	 1897,	 the	 tiny	 but	 loyal	 British	 community	 was	 unable	 to	 send	 a	
congratulatory	message	owing	to	the	absence	of	a	telegraph	connection.78	This	isolation	






foreign	 initiative,	but	Chinese	businessmen	 in	neighbouring	 cities	and	provinces	were	




Historians	have	given	 insufficient	attention	to	the	agency	of	Chinese	merchants	 in	 the	
development	of	minor	 treaty	 ports.	Wenzhou	provides	 an	 example	where	 this	 can	 be	




















greater	 opportunities	 Shanghai	 offered,	 contributing	 to	 that	 city’s	 rise	 to	 dominance.	
From	at	least	1736,	powerful	Ningbo	guilds	were	active	in	Shanghai,	engaged	in	banking,	










they	 adopted	 two	 principal	 strategies.	 First,	 their	 capital	 enabled	 them	 to	 offer	 to	
customers	periods	of	credit	beyond	the	resources	of	merchants	in	Wenzhou.	The	result	





















paid	 could	 be	 up	 to	 40%	 less.84	 Hence,	 goods	 arriving	 in	 Wenzhou	 would	 be	 more	
expensive	than	those	imported	to	Ningbo.	Lacking	capital,	the	Wenzhou	merchants	could	
not	respond	with	a	farm	of	their	own.	The	system	continued,	to	Wenzhou’s	detriment,	for	
many	 years,	 another	 reason	 why	 places	 such	 as	 Quzhou	 continued	 to	 be	 served	 by	
Ningbo.85	
	




levied	 at	 the	 place	 of	 production	 rather	 than	 en	 route.87	 Furthermore,	 a	 mechanism	

















87	Wenzhou	 Acting-Consul	 Edward	 Parker	 to	 Parkes,	 14	 September	 1883	 (TNA,	 FO	 228/709,	 10);	 FO	
Wenchow	1888,	4.	




Wenzhou’s	 experience	 challenges	 many	 historians’	 observations	 regarding	 the	
dominance	of	foreign	commercial	activity	in	the	treaty	ports.	Against	the	background	of	
Wenzhou’s	 lacklustre	 economy,	 an	 absence	 of	 foreign	 merchants,	 intra-regional	
protectionism,	 and	 the	workings	 of	 the	 lijin	 system,	 one	 business	 thrived.	 The	 China	
Merchants	 Steam	 Navigation	 Company	 had	 been	 established	 in	 1873	 as	 the	 first	
enterprise	 under	 the	 Qing	 state’s	 ‘official	 supervision	 and	 merchant	 management’	
system.89	The	company	had	the	declared	intention	of	competing	with	foreign	steamship	
operators,	 even	 if	 this	 entailed	 making	 a	 loss.90	 Far	 from	 being	 an	 arm	 of	 the	 Qing	
government,	China	Merchants	operated	under	the	‘efficient	and	aggressive’	management	
of	Chinese	merchant-shareholders.91	Furthermore,	its	profitability	was	greatly	assisted	
by	 government	 support,	 under	 the	 ‘official	 supervision’	 element	 of	 its	 structure;	 it	
received	 interest-free	 loans,	 tax	 concessions,	 and	 was	 awarded	 a	 monopoly	 in	 the	
carrying	of	tribute	rice,	for	which	higher-than-market	freights	were	paid.	This	monopoly	





































sharing.	 In	 1882,	 the	 other	 major	 operator,	 Jardines,	 joined	 the	 common	 pooling	
arrangement,	 one	 term	of	which	was	 that	 neither	 foreign	 company	would	operate	 to	
Wenzhou.	The	agreement	lapsed	in	1890,	the	time	of	Hosie’s	visit	to	Shanghai,	and	there	
followed	a	period	of	 ‘squabblings	and	bickerings’	between	 the	erstwhile	 collaborators	






centric	 analysis	 by	 Reinhardt,	 in	 which	 she	 argued	 that	 it	 was	 the	 major	 British	




















Nevertheless,	 smaller	 foreign	 operators,	 not	 party	 to	 the	 cartel,	 occasionally	 took	 an	











giving	 them	 a	 keen	 personal	 interest	 in	 the	 business.101	 Even	without	 inter-company	
pooling	arrangements,	 such	 features	of	China	Merchants’	business	practices	made	 the	
company	hard	to	dislodge.	In	demonstrating	the	company’s	competitive	edge,	founded	on	
practices	and	privileges	unavailable	to	its	foreign	peers,	my	study	shows	China	Merchants	




1890s,	 the	 Chinese	 government	 encouraged	 the	 creation	 of	 more	 Chinese	 steamship	









Western	 impact	 on	 China’.103	 By	 the	 1920s,	 eighteen	 shipping	 companies	 were	







British	 treaty	 ports	 in	 China	 is	 altered	 by	 studying	Wenzhou.	 First,	 we	 see	 how	 the	
important	step	of	opening	a	treaty	port	could	be	based	on	inadequate	knowledge	of	the	
country	and	its	commercial	networks;	this	develops	the	first	of	my	arguments,	that	the	
mercantile	 influence	 guiding	 British	 policy	 was	 sometimes	 misplaced.	 Second,	 I	
demonstrate	how	Chinese	networks	functioned	in	a	treaty-port	environment,	and	how	
they	responded	to	the	 foreign	 intrusion;	 this	supports	my	third	argument,	 that	 treaty-
port	privileges	could	be	appropriated	by	Chinese	interests.	The	experience	of	Wenzhou	




time	 it	 became	 a	 treaty	 port.	 Although	 the	 rationale	 for	Wenzhou’s	 selection	was	 its	
commercial	potential,	belief	 in	 that	potential	was	misplaced;	 there	 is	no	evidence	that	
Wenzhou’s	perceived	attractions	were	verified	by	any	arm	of	the	British	state,	in	whose	
name	 the	 port	was	 opened.	 The	 first	 detailed	assessment	 by	 a	 British	 official,	 Consul	
Davenport	 in	 early	 1877,	 some	 months	 after	 the	 treaty	 was	 signed,	 revealed	 many	
indications	that	 the	port	was	not	destined	to	succeed.	Davenport’s	observations	could	
easily	have	been	arrived	at	by	any	similarly-experienced	official	investigating	the	port’s	




















































Chinese	 companies.	 Moreover,	 whereas	 Reinhardt’s	 approach	 was	 to	 focus	 on	 the	




No	 ‘politics	of	 semi-colonialism’	prevailed	at	Wenzhou.112	Hence,	Wenzhou	did	not	 fit	
Reinhardt’s	mould,	nor	that	of	many	other	treaty-port	scholars.	Instead,	Wenzhou	met	all	
the	 requirements	 set	 by	 Darwin,	 Cain	 and	 Hopkins,	 Porter,	 Murphey	 and	 others	 for	
colonial	port	cities,	with	the	important	distinction	that	it	was	not	colonial;	it	was	Chinese.	
	












































Although	 the	 two	 ports	 were	 opened	 in	 very	 different	 circumstances,	 the	 study	 of	
Jiangmen,	 like	 Wenzhou,	 develops	 all	 four	 of	 the	 arguments	 established	 in	 the	





of	 Jiangmen	 demonstrates	 that	 the	 treaty	 ports	 were	 not	 homogeneous.	 Jiangmen’s	
importance	 grew	 as	 a	 site	 of	 Chinese	 commercial	 enterprise,	 countering	 Murphey’s	
argument	 that	 it	was	 foreigners	who	 initiated	 infrastructural	 changes	 in	 colonial	port	
cities.	 Studying	 Jiangmen	provides	greater	understanding	of	 the	gulf	between	colonial	
ambition	and	practical	on-the-spot	reality.	Despite	sixty	years’	experience	in	the	selection	





serving	 both	 West	 and	 North	 rivers.	 Tobacco	 was	 a	 major	 industry,	 as	 were	
manufacturing	grass-cloth	and	fans.	Timber,	bricks	and	bamboo	furniture	were	exported.	












2	 Information	 about	 Jiangmen’s	 early	 economic	 activity	 is	 taken	 from:	 Acting-Consul	 Everard	 Fraser,	
Guangzhou,	 to	 Claude	MacDonald,	British	Minister,	 Beijing,	 14	May	1897	 (TNA,	 CO	129/279,	 305);	FO	








former	 treaty	 ports	 provided	 an	 overview	 of	 Jiangmen’s	 history	 and	 development.5	









the	 satisfaction	 of	 some	 imperial	 geostrategic	 or	 infrastructural	 purpose.	 For	Britain,	
Jiangmen	met	none	of	these	expectations.	Despite	having	been	founded	in	response	to	a	
perceived	French	threat,	 Jiangmen	did	not	become	a	base	 for	 the	projection	of	British	
power.	Furthermore,	no	foreign	merchants	witnessed	the	port’s	opening	in	1904.7	A	few	



















ambitions,	 and	 the	 practical	 difficulties	 facing	 foreign	 trade	 on	 the	 West	 River,	 and	
examines	 the	 part	 played	 by	 Jiangmen	 in	 each.	 For	 the	 first	 section,	 I	 have	 drawn	on	
studies	of	Anglo-French	relations	and	railway	imperialism,	contemporary	newspapers,	
and	 British	 Foreign	 Office	 and	 other	 government	 papers.9	 Studying	 the	 treaty-port	
experience	 of	 Jiangmen	 provides	 scope	 for	 understanding	 the	 transient	 effect	 of	
geostrategic	ambition	at	a	local	level.	Britain	had	established	a	sphere	of	influence	over	
the	West	River	following	fears	that	the	trade	of	south-west	China	would	be	diverted	by	
French	 interests	 into	their	 Indo-China	 colonies.	The	extent	of	British	 influence	 can	be	
seen	in	the	map	on	page	55,	which	shows	the	furthest	points	to	which	British	gunboats	





a	 reaction	 to	 a	 rapidly	 changing	 political	 situation,	 one	 that	 was	 soon	 supplanted	 as	
Britain’s	 strategic	 priorities	 shifted	 elsewhere.	 Reflecting	 the	 limited	 extent	 to	which	




The	 second	 section,	 dealing	 with	 the	 practical	 difficulties	 of	 using	 the	 long-awaited	




twentieth	 centuries;	 the	 complexity	 of	 these	 alone	 goes	 a	 long	way	 to	 explaining	 the	




Imperialism	 and	 Local	 Elites,	 1905–1911’,	 in	 Bickers	 and	 Howlett	 (eds.),	 Britain	 and	 China,	 130–47;	
Edwards,	British	Diplomacy,	30–52;	and	Peter	Lowe,	Britain	 in	 the	Far	East:	A	Survey	 from	1819	 to	 the	




consulted	 the	 works	 of	 Liu	 and	 Hao,	 and	 reports	 by	 the	 Maritime	 Customs.11	 These	
sources	enabled	me	to	provide	an	account	of	Jiangmen	immediately	before	it	became	a	
treaty	port,	and	the	aspirations	prevailing	when	it	was	awarded	that	status.	Those	hopes	










westernmost	 province.	 The	 French	 colonial	 government	 of	 Indo-China	 promoted	 the	
diversion	 of	 trade	 southwards	 by	 rail	 into	 Tonkin,	 present-day	 Vietnam.13	 British	
commercial	interests,	particularly	those	in	Hong	Kong,	wanted	to	draw	that	trade	to	the	




endeavour,	 more	 open	 to	 newcomers.	 French	 merchants	 therefore	 saw	 railway	
















Although	 none	 visited	 Jiangmen,	 Western	 observers	 had	 accumulated	 significant	
information	 regarding	 China’s	 south-west.	 Successive	 British	 consular	 reports	 were	





given	 the	 terrain,	 river	 navigation	was	 hazardous	 and	 a	 railway	 unlikely.	 A	 consular	
assistant	in	Bangkok	reported	in	1892:	‘…	it	is	difficult	to	find	sufficient	grounds	for	the	












region.	How	were	 these	 various	 reports	 received	 by	 their	 respective	 readers?	 French	
colonial	advances	in	Tonkin	were	but	a	stepping-stone	towards	the	markets	of	China.20	
Any	 reports	 that	 supported	 that	 aim	 were,	 therefore,	 welcomed	 by	 French	 officials.	









19	 This	 paragraph	 draws	 on	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 various	British	 and	 French	 reports	 on	 the	 commercial	
potential	of	Yunnan	in	Warren	B.	Walsh,	‘The	Yunnan	Myth’,	Far	Eastern	Quarterly,	Vol.	2,	No.	3	(May	1943),	
272–285.	




other	 non-business	 people	 could	 easily	 be	 set	 aside	 by	 those	whose	mission	was	 the	










was	 also	 imperial	 prestige;	 if	 Britain	 were	 not	 to	 stake	 its	 claim	 for	 the	 commercial	

























most	 likely	 come	up	against	 those	acceded	 to	rivals.26	Hao	only	argued	his	 concept	of	
‘Chinese	 commercial	 nationalism’	 in	 the	 context	 of	 merchants’	 activities;	 I	 suggest	 a	
similar	 strategy	was	 adopted	 here	 by	 organs	 of	 the	 Chinese	 state.	 In	 the	 south-west,	
Chinese	strategy	focused	on	the	respective	demands	by	France	and	Britain	for	railway	
and	shipping	rights.	French	efforts	had	taken	an	early	 lead;	 the	 first	 treaty	port	 in	 the	
region	was	the	West	River	town	of	Longzhou	(Lungchow),	some	800	kilometres	west	of	
Jiangmen,	 opened	 by	 France	 in	 1887.	 The	 French	 colonial	 government’s	 plan	 was	 to	
extend	 its	Haiphong	 railway	 through	Longzhou	 to	Kunming,	 capital	of	Yunnan.	Facing	
difficulties	 with	 securing	 permission	 as	 well	 as	 engineering	 problems,	 it	 was	 not	
completed	until	1910.27	But	at	least	it	was	completed.	
	
There	 had	 never	 been	 any	 enthusiastic	 official	 support	 for	 a	 British	 Burma-Yunnan	




the	advantage	of	 a	 railway	 thence	 to	 the	West	River.30	The	 idea	was	always	met	with	
vigorous	opposition	by	French	interests,	who	had	already	been	granted	the	right	to	build	
such	a	line.31	Naturally,	they	did	not	exercise	their	right,	preferring	to	try	and	divert	trade	

























in	 1897,	 and	 Jiangmen	 was	 made	 a	 port-of-call.33	 The	 next	 target	 was	 Nanning,	 460	
kilometres	west	of	Wuzhou	and	only	160	kilometres	from	the	Tonkin	border.	However,	
rather	 than	 risk	 losing	 control	 over	 this	 potentially	 revenue-generating	 river-port	 by	
allowing	 Britain	 or	 France	 to	 claim	 it	 by	 treaty,	 an	 Imperial	 Decree	 of	 1899	 opened	
Nanning	unilaterally	for	foreign	trade.34	French	interests	wanted	to	link	Nanning	as	an	
eastern	extension	 to	 their	Tonkin-Yunnan	 railway.	Britain	was	hoping	 for	a	 line	 from	










Foreign	 trade	 at	 Longzhou	was	 insignificant;	 small	 quantities	 of	 goods	were	 brought	
overland	on	their	way	to	Tonkin,	mainly	because	of	excessive	lijin	on	the	upper	reaches	






















insignificant	 foreign	business	at	 these	places	 indicates	 imperial	rivalry	overshadowing	
commercial	 logic.	 Then,	 in	 1902,	 the	 Mackay	 Treaty	 handed	 Sanshui’s	 mantle	 to	





Article	 VIII	 opened	 five	 new	 treaty	 ports,	 including	 Jiangmen.	 It	 also	 abolished	 the	
unpopular	 inland	 duty	 system	 known	 as	 lijin,	 but	was	 conditional	 upon	 all	 the	 other	
treaty	powers	negotiating	similar	 treaties.	As	only	 Japan	and	the	United	States	did	so,	
Article	 VIII	 lapsed.39	 Article	 X,	 however,	 in	 addition	 to	 amending	 certain	 regulations	
regarding	 inland	 navigation,	 provided	 specifically	 for	 the	 opening	 of	 Jiangmen,	 a	
prescient	precaution	against	the	failure	of	Article	VIII.	There	was	much	press	coverage	of	
the	 treaty,	 but	 only	 regarding	 its	 lijin	 aspects.	 Shanghai’s	North-China	Herald	 gave	 an	
eleven-page	verbatim	account	of	the	deliberations	on	the	treaty	by	the	Shanghai	Branch	
of	The	China	Association,	most	of	which	related	to	lijin;	there	was	no	mention	of	Jiangmen	
other	than	the	 fact	of	 its	opening.40	This	was	despite	 the	Association’s	later	claim	that	
Jiangmen’s	opening	was	‘due	in	no	small	degree’	to	its	representations.41	
	






















in	1897,	 its	 trade	came	under	the	purview	of	 the	Maritime	Customs.	Reported	 figures	
were	encouraging,	although	their	reliability	will	be	assessed	in	the	next	section.	However,	
three	 developments	 served	 to	 alter	 British	 strategy	 to	 the	 further	 detriment	 of	 any	
potential	 the	 newly-opened	 treaty	 port	 may	 have	 had:	 a	 geographical	 refocusing	 of	
British	 interests	 in	 China;	 a	 concentration	 on	 railways	 rather	 than	 trade;	 and	 an	








A	 surprising	 rapprochement	 between	 Britain	 and	 France	 was	 the	 third	 development.	
Friction	between	the	two	imperial	powers	had	been	mounting	in	many	parts	of	the	world,	
but	 in	 1904	 an	 entente	 cordiale	was	 signed	which	 amounted	 to	 a	 division	of	 colonial	
spoils.44	 Anglo-French	 rivalry	 persisted,	 but	 only	 to	 the	 extent	 appropriate	 between	
competing	 commercial	 interests.	 For	 Britain,	 those	 interests	 no	 longer	 justified	
promoting	Jiangmen	and	West	River	trade	on	what	had	been	chiefly	a	point	of	principle.	
Besides,	there	was	a	growing	realisation	that	the	commercial	potential	of	the	river	had	
been	 overstated	 significantly.	 Foreign	 attempts	 to	 realise	 that	 potential	 had	 already	
proved	 challenging	 and,	 as	 the	 next	 section	will	 demonstrate,	 the	 problems	were	 not	
alleviated	by	having	an	additional	treaty	port	on	the	river.	
																																																								













been	 opened	 before	 the	 arrival	 of	 written	 instructions,	 resulting	 in	 a	 long	 period	 of	
confusion	 regarding	 such	 basic	 matters	 as	 hours	 of	 operation	 and	 the	 position	 of	
anchorages.46	 Second,	 the	existing	 trade,	 including	 in	 foreign	goods,	was	 firmly	 in	 the	
hands	of	Chinese	merchants.	In	a	reversal	of	Murphey’s	concept,	the	vacuum	left	by	the	
foreigners’	 inability	 to	use	 the	West	River	 treaty	ports	 to	 their	maximum	benefit	was	
filled	by	Chinese	interests.	
	
This	 section	 examines	 the	 second	 and	 third	 arguments	 on	which	 this	 dissertation	 is	
based,	 namely	 that	 practical	 difficulties	 prevented	 foreign	merchants	 from	 operating	
profitably,	and	that	foreign-initiated	privileges	and	facilities	were	appropriated	by	local	
interests.	My	analysis	starts	with	a	consideration	of	what	the	‘opening’	of	the	river	meant	

















permitted	 to	 navigate	 between	 Sanshui,	 Wuzhou,	 Guangzhou	 and	 Hong	 Kong.48	 Also	
created	 were	 four	 ports-of-call	 where	 passengers	 and	 cargo	 could	 be	 shipped	 and	
offloaded:	Jiangmen	and	Ganzhu	(Kumchuk),	on	the	route	taken	to	the	river	by	vessels	
from	Macao	and	Hong	Kong;	and	Zhaoqing	(Shuihing)	and	Deqing	(Takhing),	between	
Sanshui	 and	 Wuzhou.	 Although	 an	 improvement	 on	 the	 pre-treaty	 situation,	 these	
limitations	meant	the	river	was	not	entirely	‘open’.	
	





province.	 It	 was	 almost	 impossible	 to	 legislate	 for	 such	 an	 absurd	 situation,	 yet	



















50	MacDonald	 to	 Foreign	 Secretary	 Lord	 Salisbury,	 16	April	 1898	 (China	No.	 1	 [1899]:	 Correspondence	













such	 as	 between	 Guangzhou	 and	 Jiangmen.	 Lijin,	 almost	 universally	 criticised	 by	
foreigners,	had	 the	advantage	of	 accruing	 in	stages	en	 route;	 short	 journeys	would,	 in	
theory,	attract	less	taxation.53	
	










example,	 the	1897	West	River	 regulations	 restricted	 foreign	 steamers	to	one	 channel,	
whereas	the	1898	Inland	Waters	regulations	allowed	steamers	to	‘proceed	to	and	fro	at	
will’.56	Moreover,	steamers	were	required	to	be	 licensed	under	one	set	of	rules	or	 the	























launches,	 which	 themselves	 carried	 no	 cargo,	 were	 treated	 as	 merely	 the	 means	 of	
propulsion,	 hence	 outwith	 the	 regulations	 governing	 steam-carried	 trade.58	 Using	 a	








The	 desire	 to	 optimise	 use	 of	 resources	 led	 operators	 of	 vessels	 licensed	 under	 each	




They	 were	 refused.60	 An	 1899	memorandum	 by	 a	 member	 of	 the	 China	 Association	
recommended	all	vessels	on	the	river	be	 licensed	to	conduct	any	trade,	provided	they	
remain	 in	Chinese	waters.	Another	suggestion	was	 for	 the	Customs	 to	pass	 the	 treaty	




















commissioners	 and	 British	 consuls	 of	 the	 West	 River	 ports,	 attended	 also	 by	
representatives	 of	 the	 British	 shipping	 companies,	 concluded	 that	 the	 difficulty	 of	




Claude	MacDonald	 in	Beijing,	complaining	of	 the	Chinese	government’s	 ‘evasive	policy	
[that	sought]	to	impose	such	restrictions	on	the	opening	of	[the	West	River]	as	will	render	
the	 whole	 Concession	 valueless’.	 Consul	 Jamieson,	 in	 his	 trade	 report	 for	 1899	
emphasised	the	absurdity	of	a	steamer	with	a	West	River	certificate	being	debarred	from	
calling	at	intermediate	places	when	plying	the	West	River,	requiring	a	second	steamer	to	
carry	 cargo	 back	 over	 the	 same	 ground	 to	 its	 destination.63	 In	 late	 1900,	 all	 British	
steamers	 plying	 between	 Hong	 Kong	 and	 Wuzhou	 were	 withdrawn.	 The	 China	 Mail	
described	 the	 ‘so-called’	 opening	 of	 the	 river,	 with	 its	 restrictive	 regulations	 and	
differential	treatment	of	British	vessels,	as	‘an	utter	farce’.64	
	

















new	 regulations	 for	 the	West	River,	 combining	 the	West	River	 and	 Inland	Navigation	




Chinese	 Customs	 supervision,	 and	 their	manifests	 certified	 accordingly,	 but	 he	 noted	
objections	by	Hong	Kong’s	governor	and	chamber	of	commerce;	the	chamber	had	only	




























Jiangmen,	 as	 we	 have	 seen,	 was	 an	 important	 local	 agricultural,	 distribution	 and	
manufacturing	centre,	although	its	prosperity	was	affected	by	the	opening	of	treaty	ports	





they	 were	 not	 a	 reliable	 indicator,	 as	 scholars	 have	 shown	 and	 officials	 at	 the	 time	












contributory	 factor,	 but	 there	 was	 another	 type	 of	 transhipment.	 Large	 quantities	 of	
Jiangmen	 tobacco,	 and	other	products,	destined	 for	 the	 interior,	were	 sent	by	 junk	 to	
















chief	 reason	 why	 goods	 destined	 for	 Nanning	 were	 shipped	 first	 to	 Beihai	 and	 then	
overland	 to	a	point	on	 the	West	River	a	 little	downstream	 from	Nanning.	Conversely,	






its	 opening,	 yet	 its	 trade	 was	 directly	 attributable	 to	 its	 treaty-port	 status.	 Steamers	
coming	from	Hong	Kong	were	obliged	to	make	a	treaty	port	their	terminus,	and	the	first	
one	 they	 came	 to	 on	 the	West	River	was	 Sanshui,	 a	 place,	 as	 stated,	 otherwise	 of	 no	
commercial	 importance.	 Jiangmen,	 conversely,	not	only	had	 significant	 industries,	but	
was	 also	 an	 important	 embarkation	 port	 for	 Chinese	 migrant	 labour.80	 Under	 the	
regulations,	any	Hong-Kong-bound	exports	or	emigrants	originating	in	Jiangmen	had	to	
first	 tranship	 at	 Sanshui.	 Likewise,	 any	 incoming	 vessels	 would	 first	 have	 to	 call	 at	
Sanshui,	even	though	they	may	have	passed	Jiangmen	on	the	way.	As	all	this	trade	was	
Chinese,	 not	 foreign,	 was	 the	 avoidance	 of	 this	 time-consuming	 detour	 sufficient	
justification	 for	 Jiangmen’s	opening	as	a	British	 treaty	port?	Sanshui	hosted	neither	a	
British	consulate,	apart	 from	very	briefly,	nor	a	British	trading	community.	Surely	 the	
same	would	apply	at	 any	other	port	opened	with	 the	 same	rationale.	 Jiangmen	was	a	


















its	 importance	 as	 a	 trade	 centre’.82	 However,	 in	 his	 first	 Trade	 Report	 as	 Jiangmen	
Customs	 Commissioner,	 Maze	 stated:	 ‘At	 present	 there	 are	 no	 indications	 that	 the	
sanguine	 expectations,	 based	 upon	 imperfect	 knowledge,	 entertained	 concerning	 the	
over-estimated	commercial	possibilities	of	the	place	will	be	speedily,	if	ever,	realised.’	He	
expressed	the	same	view	a	year	later.83	His	comment	would	have	been	influenced	by	the	
almost	 total	 absence	 of	 foreign	 merchants	 at	 Jiangmen,	 despite	 all	 the	 ‘hurried	






These	 included	 four	 Portuguese	 from	Macao	 who	 arrived	 in	 June	 1904,	 erected	 two	
buildings	 and	 started	 a	 manufacturing	 business;	 two	 remained	 until	 1907	 and	 none	
thereafter.86	British-qualified	Master	Mariner	Joseph	Lewingdon	was	listed	in	the	1905	
directory;	a	Hong	Kong-based	West	River	steamer	captain,	in	the	Jiangmen	entry	he	was	



















following	 year	 although	 he,	 and	 a	 number	 of	 British	 officers,	 continued	 to	 command	
Chinese	 vessels.	 Also	 listed	 for	 1904	 was	 Captain	 J.B.A.	 Grote,	 latterly	 ‘a	 recognised	
authority	on	China’s	waterways’;	he	too	does	not	appear	in	later	directories.88	Four	other	
























the	 unfortunate	 victim’s	 body	 was	 left	 for	 four	 days	 at	 the	 entrance	 to	 the	 Customs	














Since	 the	 mid-nineteenth	 century,	 Jiangmen	 had	 been	 an	 embarkation	 point	 for	
emigrants	 seeking	 work	 abroad.96	 Initially	 travelling	 to	 Hong	 Kong	 by	 junk	 before	
boarding	a	trans-Pacific	vessel,	from	1897	they	would	have	caught	a	Hong	Kong-bound	
steamer	at	 the	new	treaty	port	of	Sanshui.	 In	1901,	an	estimated	177,000	passengers,	
mostly	 from	 Jiangmen,	 passed	 through	 Sanshui	 en	 route	 for	 Hong	 Kong.97	 With	 the	













local	 banks.98	 After	 1901,	 numbers	 of	 passengers	 became	 hard	 to	 establish.	 British	











on	 the	West	 River	 bank,	 upstream	 from	 the	 mouth	 of	 the	 creek.101	 There	 was	 good	






























China	 to	 be	 financed,	 built	 and	 operated	 entirely	 by	 Chinese.103	 In	 1912,	 the	 railway	
company	built	a	new	wharf	at	the	north	end	of	Beijie,	where	passengers	from	its	adjacent	
terminus	station	could	transfer	onto	Hong-Kong-bound	steamers.	Within	ten	years	the	








their	 imperial	 muscles,	 soon	 diverting	 their	 attention	 elsewhere.	 The	 Chinese	
entrepreneurs	of	Jiangmen,	on	the	other	hand,	focused	their	efforts	locally,	and	prospered	








success	 abounds	 in	 those	 ports	 today.	Had	 there	 grown	 a	 thriving	 foreign	 settlement	
along	 Jiangmen’s	 bund,	 with	 beautiful	 colonial	 residences	 and	 commercial	 buildings,	












not	 make	 the	 port	 a	 British	 commercial	 success.	 As	 a	 colonial	 port	 city,	 Jiangmen	
demonstrably	failed.	This	conclusion	can	be	reached	after	a	half-hour’s	stroll	along	Beijie.	
	
Yet	 the	 fact	 that	 Jiangmen	was	 a	 thriving	 commercial	 centre	 is	 no	 paradox;	 it	 was	 a	
thriving	Chinese	commercial	centre,	before,	during	and	after	its	experience	as	a	treaty	









Darwin	 argued	 that	 the	 ‘British	world-system’	 depended	 on	 the	 physical	 trappings	of	
business	and	a	chain	of	 imperial	communications;	neither	was	evident	 in	 Jiangmen.106	
Nevertheless,	this	study	of	Jiangmen	and	its	role	as	a	British	treaty	port	underlines	the	







as	 to	make	the	West	River	an	unattractive	place	 for	 foreigners	to	try	to	make	a	profit.	
Even	though	seven	years	had	passed	between	 the	opening	of	Sanshui	and	Wuzhou,	 in	









part	 of	 Jiangmen’s	 commercial	 activity	 long	 before	 1904.	 Treaty-port	 status	 enabled	
Jiangmen’s	Chinese	merchants	 to	 streamline	 these	activities	by	way	of	direct	 steamer	






the	expectations	and	norms	 that	applied	 to	 treaty	ports,	 yet	 at	 the	 same	 time	did	not	
follow	 others.	 For	 example,	 treaty-port	 status	 enabled	 foreign	 powers	 to	 establish	
consulates	if	they	wished,	although	Britain	was	the	only	one	to	do	so,	and	that	only	for	
less	 than	a	year.	Treaty	ports	were	places	where	 foreign	merchants	could	 live	and	do	
business,	yet	almost	none	did	so	at	Jiangmen.	Treaty	ports,	being	technically	centres	of	
foreign	trade,	required	the	presence	of	the	Maritime	Customs	to	collect	import	and	export	





















expansion	 and	 interaction	 with	 indigenous	 commercial	 systems.	 Darwin,	 Cain	 and	
Hopkins,	 and	Porter	all	 suggested	 that	 colonial	port	 cities	were	agents	of	 commercial	
expansion	and	imperial	control;	my	two	case-study	ports	are	examples	where	any	such	






themselves	 in	 pursuit	 of	 their	 own	 ambitions.	 Indeed,	 this	 thesis	 questions	 whether	
Wenzhou	 and	 Jiangmen	qualified	 as	 colonial	port	 cities	 at	 all,	 apart	 from	 featuring	 in	





than	 historians	 imply.	 Studying	 these	 two	 ports,	 and	 others	 like	 them,	 enables	 us	 to	
question	 the	 generality	 of	 many	 scholarly	 assertions	 regarding	 colonial	 expansion,	
informal	empire,	and	treaty	ports.	
	
This	 thesis	began	with	a	report	of	 the	opening	ceremony	of	 Jiangmen,	one	of	 the	least	
successful	 treaty	 ports,	 on	 7	 March	 1904.	 Chapter	 Two	 demonstrated	 that	 despite	
expectations,	 no	British	 trading	 community	 took	 root	 there.	 Instead	 it	 continued	 as	 a	
centre	of	Chinese	commercial	activity.	Chapter	One	showed	that	Wenzhou	had	a	similar	
experience.	 Has	 this	 study,	 therefore,	 been	 of	 the	 development	 of	 Chinese	 business	


















promoters	 were	 certain	 that	 British	 trade	 would	 flourish	 there;	 but	 as	 I	 have	
demonstrated,	 the	exercise	of	prior	due	diligence	would	have	revealed	that	 this	was	a	








Yen-ping	Hao	argued	 that	 the	1842	Nanjing	Treaty	was	not	as	 ‘epoch-making’	 as	 it	 is	
















that	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 the	 Chinese	 rejected	 foreign	 innovations;	 Dikötter	 argued	 that	
suggestions	that	they	did	so	are	not	grounded	in	substantial	empirical	work.3	My	point	is	
that	 treaty	 ports,	 even	 small	 ones,	 benefitted	 from	 treaty-port	 status,	 with	 their	
steamships,	 particularly,	 helping	 to	 modernise	 China.	 This	 also	 helps	 to	 answer	 my	
question:	 although	 not	 seen	 at	 the	 time,	 foreign-imposed	 trading	 centres	 were	
increasingly	 irrelevant	 in	 the	 face	 of	 China’s	 ongoing	 and	 accelerating	 commercial	
development.	
	
This	dissertation	has	also	been	a	 study	of	Britain’s	China	policy.	 Scholars	point	 to	 the	
apparent	lack	of	an	overall	strategy	regarding	British	penetration	of	China.	Was	the	large	
number	 of	 unsuccessful	 treaty	 ports	 a	 reflection	 of	 a	 ‘you	win	 some,	 you	 lose	 some’	
attitude?	 I	 suggest	 it	 would	 be	 inappropriate	 to	 attribute	 such	 a	 casual	 approach	 to	
Britain’s	 treaty-port	 experience.	 However,	 as	 Martin	 Lynn,	 argued,	 there	 was	 a	 gulf	



















not	 reflect	 in	 the	 possession	 of	 more	 profitable	 knowledge	 of	 the	 country	 and	 its	
commercial	systems.	Pelcovits	argued	that	British	merchants	were	often	more	positive	

















they	 found	 them.	 They	 had	 adopted	 features	of	 an	 alien	 civilisation	 and	 become,	 and	
remain,	hybrids:	part	Western,	part	Eastern.	Almost	nothing	is	visible	today	in	Wenzhou	


















each	 would	 support	 the	 four	 main	 arguments	 of	 this	 paper:	 that	 commercial	
considerations	 were	 sometimes	 misplaced	 or	 overridden;	 that	 unforeseen	 practical	






Exploring	many	of	China’s	modern	cities	 today,	 large	and	small,	 one	 is	 likely	 to	 come	
across	 architectural	 anachronisms:	 European	 buildings,	 former	 consulates,	 custom	
houses,	or	merchants’	residences.	These	are	increasingly	being	cared	for	by	the	Chinese	




































	 B7/50	 	 Business	letters,	from	4	October	1877.	
	 C42/3	 	 Letters,	John	Wilson,	April	1877.	
















































1885	 French	 Treaty.	 Treaty	 of	 Peace,	 Friendship,	 and	 Commerce	 between	 France	 and	
China.	Signed	at	Tianjin,	9	June	1885.	
1897	 Burmah	 Agreement.	 Agreement	 between	 Great	 Britain	 and	 China	 modifying	 the	




































China	 No.	 12	 (1869):	 Correspondence	 with	 the	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 at	 Shanghae	
respecting	the	Revision	of	the	Treaty	of	Tien-tsin.	



































Reports	 on	 Trade	 at	 the	 Treaty	 Ports	 in	 China	 for	 the	 Year	 1867	 (Shanghai:	 Inspector	
General	of	Customs,	1868).	
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